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Summary
Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature
on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, ac-
cording to which agentive self-awareness is fundamen-
tally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a
central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach
that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by low-
level processes grounded in the very machinery re-
sponsible for motor production and control. Neither ap-
proach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; how-
ever, the question of whether their combination would
yield a full account of agentive self-awareness remains
very much open. 
In this paper, I contrast two disorders affecting the con-
trol of voluntary action: the anarchic hand syndrome
and utilization behavior. Although in both conditions
patients fail to inhibit actions that are elicited by ob-
jects in the environment but inappropriate with respect
to the wider context, these actions are experienced in
radically different ways by the two groups of patients. I
discuss how top-down and bottom-up processes in-
volved in the generation of agentive self-awareness
would have to be related in order to account for these
differences. 
KEY WORDS: agentive self-awareness, anarchic hand syndrome,
motor control, utilization behaviour, voluntary action.
Introduction
The phenomenology of action, after being neglected for
a long time, is back on the agenda of philosophers and
scientists alike. Indeed there is now a burgeoning body
of literature on the mechanisms underlying “the sense of
agency”, which I will call “agentive self-awareness”. De-
spite the recent explosion of interest in the topic, the
complexity of agentive self-awareness remains under-
appreciated. Two main approaches can be discerned in
the literature. According to a top-down approach, agen-
tive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature
and involves the operations of a central-systems narra-
tor. In contrast, a bottom-up approach maintains that
agentive self-awareness is produced by low-level mech-
anisms – predictors and comparators – that are ground-
ed in the very machinery responsible for motor produc-
tion and control. Tim Bayne and I (1-3) recently argued
that neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in
isolation1. Instead, they should be combined and sup-
plemented in order to yield a full account of agentive
self-awareness. 
This question of just how top-down and bottom-up
processes interact to yield agentive self-awareness is
still largely unanswered. One source of insight is the
study of disturbances of motor function and of the way
these disturbances can differentially impact on agentive
self-awareness. In this paper, I will contrast two disor-
ders affecting the control of voluntary action: the anar-
chic hand syndrome (AHS) and utilization behavior
(UB). In both conditions, patients perform actions elicit-
ed by objects in the environment even though these ac-
tions are inappropriate with respect to the wider context.
In both conditions then, patients fail to inhibit unwanted,
stimulus-driven actions. Despite these behavioral simi-
larities, from a phenomenological point of view, these
actions are experienced in radically different ways by
the two groups of patients. Whereas AHS patients report
the actions of their anarchic hand as unintended and
complain that their hand is out of their control, patients
with UB make no such complaint and never exhibit sur-
prise or perplexity at their own behavior. How can we ac-
count for these differences in agentive self-awareness?
I start by giving a more detailed description of both syn-
dromes and the brain lesions underlying them. I then ar-
gue that neither a pure top-down, narrative explanation,
nor a pure bottom-up comparator explanation can ac-
count for the phenomenological discrepancy between
AHS and UB. I further argue that merely combining the
two is not sufficient to account for this discrepancy, but
that the two sets of mechanisms must be supplemented
with a third set for an explanation to be forthcoming.
The anarchic hand syndrome and utilization behavior
There has been some taxonomical confusion in the neu-
rological literature, where the term “alien hand” has
been used to refer to a variety of clinical conditions.
These include the uncontrolled behavior of an upper
limb, the failure to recognize ownership of a limb in the
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1 The discussion of narrator-based and comparator-based approaches to agentive self-awareness in this paper draws heavily on Bayne &
Pacherie 2007 (2).
absence of involuntary movement, and involuntary
movements of a hand concomitant with failure to recog-
nize the hand as one’s own. Della Sala and colleagues
proposed restricting the term “alien hand” to conditions
involving the feeling of non-belonging of a hand and in-
troduced “anarchic hand” to refer to conditions where
subjects perform involuntary movements with their hand
but acknowledge the hand as theirs (4-8).
Here is how Marchetti and Della Salla (6) define AHS:
“Anarchic hand defines the occurrence of complex
movements of an upper limb which are clearly goal-
directed and well executed but unintended… These
unwanted movements cannot be voluntarily inter-
rupted and might interfere with the desired actions
carried out by the other (healthy) hand. The patients
are aware of the bizarre and potentially hazardous
behavior of their hand but cannot inhibit it. They of-
ten refer to the feeling that one of their hands be-
haves as if it has a will of its own, but never deny
that this capricious hand is part of their own body.
The bewilderment comes from the surprising and
unwanted actions, not from a sensation of lack of
belonging of the hand.”
Some authors (9,10) further distinguish between two
forms of the anarchic hand. One form is associated with
anterior cortical lesions involving damage to the supple-
mentary motor area (SMA), anterior cingulate and medi-
al prefrontal cortex, particularly on the left, together with
lesions of the anterior corpus callosum, and involves re-
flexive grasping, groping and compulsive tool manipula-
tion with the anarchic hand, which the agent reports be-
ing unable to prevent. A second form of anarchic hand
emerges after a right frontal and/or anterior callosal le-
sion and involves intermanual conflict, where the anar-
chic hand acts at cross-purposes with the other hand2. 
Anecdotal evidence and clinical observations suggest
that that AHS is triggered opportunistically by nearby ob-
jects and that the erroneous behaviors in AHS are driv-
en by environmental factors. These observations have
recently received experimental confirmation (10,11). The
essential deficit in AHS patients appears to be increased
susceptibility to exogenous factors in the environment
and thus impaired selection of appropriate motor pro-
grams. Once selected, however, the programs are di-
rected towards a specific object in the environment and
executed successfully. AHS behaviors therefore appear
as purposeful, goal-directed actions. 
Utilization behavior was first described by Lhermitte
(12), who coined the term (13,14). Patients with UB
reach out and automatically use objects in a manner
that is instrumentally correct, but inappropriate for the
particular context. For instance, in response to a pair of
glasses being placed in front of him, a patient may pick
the glasses up and put them on; if a second and then a
third pair of glasses are placed in front of him, he will put
them on, too, and will end up wearing all three pairs
(12). In environments that are physically and socially
more complex than the examiner/patient situation, these
patients show even more striking over-reliance on social
and physical cues to guide their behavior, what Lher-
mitte (15) calls “environmental dependency syndrome”.
On being told that the examiner’s apartment he was vis-
iting was a museum, one of Lhermitte’s patients began
commenting on the pictures as if they were on display.
He selected pictures that had been placed on the floor
and, noticing a hammer and nails, hammered a nail into
the wall and hung a painting. Based on an analysis of le-
sion sites in six cases of UB, Lhermitte (12) concluded
that UB arises following unilateral or bilateral frontal le-
sions. More specifically, he claimed that UB had an infe-
rior frontal localization with damage to orbito-frontal
structures. From their extensive review of studies docu-
menting UB, Archibald et al. (13) more recently conclud-
ed that the pathophysiology of UB involves dysfunction
in structures of the mesial frontal lobe and fronto-striatal
pathways, most commonly the cingulate, caudate, and
anterior and medial nuclei of the thalamus, all of which
are closely connected. 
Although both AHS and UB behaviors are automatically
elicited by physical and/or social cues3, there is a strik-
ing disanalogy in the phenomenology that these two cat-
egories of patients report. AHS patients do not deny that
their anarchic hand is theirs, but they do deny that the
actions carried out by that hand are theirs. They will
comment on their anarchic hand, stating that “it will not
do what I want it to do” (16), that “it has a mind of its
own” and is “always trying to get into the act” (17), or
that it “does what it wants to” (11). They are typically an-
noyed by the behavior of their anarchic hand and frus-
trated at their not being able to stop it. In stark contrast,
UB patients never exhibit surprise or perplexity at their
own behavior. When Lhermitte asked his patients why
they had performed these actions, they said that they
thought they were duties that had to be carried out and
that they were natural things to do. Although patients
with UB do not engage in elaborate confabulations, they
do justify their actions with such claims as “I thought I
had to do it” or “I thought you wanted me to use them”
(12,15).
I now turn to models of agentive self-awareness. Two
main approaches can be discerned in the literature: a
holistic narrator-based approach and an atomistic com-
parator-based approach. Can either of them account for
these discrepancies in agentive self-awareness?
The comparator approach to agentive self-awareness
According to one important approach to agentive self-
awareness, the processes through which the agentive
E. Pacherie
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2 Posterior callosal lesions also produce intermanual conflict, but patients then tend to disown the hand and its actions.  This should therefore
be classified as a form of AHS rather than anarchic hand. Similarly, pure feelings of strangeness, of non-belonging of the hand without invol-
untary movements are associated with posterior callosal and/or parietal damage.
3 Kritikos et al. (10) report that an intriguing aspect of their patient MA was the dissociation between his inability to perform actions with his an-
archic left hand in accordance with his intentions and his preserved ability to execute the same movements under external command. For in-
stance, when asked to grasp the examiner's fingers tightly with his left hand, he was unable to let go despite strenuous efforts to do so, but
when the examiner ordered  him to let go, he immediately did so. This suggests that in AHS behaviours, as in UB behaviors, over-reliance on
exogeneous factors may not be restricted to physical cues but also include social cues, such as verbal commands. 
self is generated are closely connected with the
processes involved in motor specification and control. I
will refer to this view as the comparator-based ap-
proach, on the grounds that the most influential versions
of it turn to the role of comparators involved in forward
models of action control to account for agentive self-
awareness (18-20). According to this approach, the mo-
tor control system makes use of two kinds of internal
models, which mimic aspects of the agent and of the ex-
ternal world. Inverse models compute the motor com-
mands for achieving a desired state given the current
state of the system and of the environment. Forward
models are fed a copy of the motor commands and com-
pute estimates of the sensory consequences of the en-
suing movements. The control of action is thought to de-
pend to a large extent on the coupling of inverse and for-
ward models through a series of comparators, the re-
sults of the comparisons being used for various kinds of
regulation.
Central to this comparator-based approach is the idea
that these predictions and comparisons also underlie
various aspects of agentive self-awareness. The sug-
gestion is, first, that awareness of an intention or “urge”
to perform an act requires the complete specification of
that act and depends on awareness of its predicted sen-
sory consequences; second, that when we are aware of
initiating an act, what we are aware of is the releasing of
the inhibitory mechanism that prevents the movement
from happening before the appropriate time; third, that
the sense of control is linked to the ongoing comparison
of predicted and actual states as the action unfolds, with
the sense of intentional causation in relation to the ef-
fects of our voluntary movements depending on the de-
gree of congruency between the predicted and actual
consequences of these movements; and fourth, that
predictions made by forward models are used to filter
sensory information and attenuate the component that is
due to self-movement. Frith (21) indeed suggests that
given that proprioceptive feedback is attenuated during
voluntary movement though forward modelling, one
possible indicator that I am performing a voluntary act
could be a lack of proprioceptive experience. Finally,
these predictions could also be used to distinguish be-
tween self-generated and externally induced sensory
changes. 
Several lines of evidence can be adduced in favour of
the comparator approach and the idea that agentive
self-awareness has its roots in the processes involved in
motor preparation and control. One of these lines of ev-
idence comes from Libet’s well-known experiments on
the timing of agency, in which healthy subjects report ini-
tiating a movement 80-200 ms before the movement ac-
tually occurs (22,23). In experiments extending Libet’s
work, Haggard and colleagues (24,25) confirmed both
that intention judgments (awareness of the intention to
move) and movement judgments (awareness of the
movement onset) precede actual movement and pro-
vide evidence that awareness of intention and of action
onset is linked to activity in premotor areas. 
A second line of evidence for the comparator approach
comes from studies showing that the perceptual conse-
quences of self-generated actions are attenuated (26-
28). Self-produced tickling sensations are both phenom-
enologically and physiologically attenuated, with the de-
gree of attenuation being proportional to the spatial and
temporal congruence between the predicted and actual
feedback. Notably, schizophrenic patients suffering from
delusion of control do not enjoy the same level of atten-
uation and are able to tickle themselves (28). 
A third line of evidence for the comparator approach in-
volves “intentional binding”, a phenomenon in which
self-produced causes and their effects are perceived as
being closer together in subjective time (29,30). Hag-
gard suggests that intentional binding is best explained
in terms of predictive mechanisms of action control: it
depends on efferent signals since it does not occur with
passive movements and it causes anticipatory aware-
ness of the effects of action, a shift that could be inter-
preted as prediction. This predictive theory suggests
that the conscious experience of action is constructed at
the time of the action itself, as an immediate by-product
of the motor control circuits generating and controlling
the actual physical movement. This view received con-
firmation in an experiment in which transcranial magnet-
ic stimulation (TMS) was used to insert occasional invol-
untary movements of the right finger at a time when the
subject already intended to press a button but had not
yet done so. Intentional binding did not occur when the
intention was interrupted by an imposed involuntary
movement that caused the button press (30).
A fourth line of evidence for the comparator model
comes from work by Sato and Yasuda (31), which con-
firms that the degree of congruency between predicted
and actual sensory feedback modulates the sense of
self-agency. 
The four lines of evidence just reviewed converge on the
view that the system(s) responsible for agentive experi-
ences are nested within the very mechanisms responsi-
ble for motor production. Crucial to the comparator ap-
proach is the notion that agentive self-awareness can be
generated by mechanisms that need not – and typically
will not – have access to fully-fledged intentions. Of
course, this research does not show that an agent’s nar-
rative self-conception plays no role in the generation of
agentive self-awareness, but it does suggest that what-
ever role it plays will be one that takes a back seat to the
comparator processes of motor control.
However, the phenomenological discrepancies present-
ed by AHS patients and UB patients challenge a purely
comparator-based approach to agentive self-aware-
ness. In both conditions, the low-level mechanisms of
motor production and control appear to be intact. The
motor programs selected in AHS and UB behaviors are
appropriate to the specific object in the environment at
which they are directed, even though they may not be
appropriate to the wider context. Furthermore, once se-
lected, they are executed proficiently and successfully.
Both AHS and UB behaviors therefore have all the ap-
pearance of purposeful, goal-directed actions. In both
AHS and UB patients, correct information regarding the
desired state, the actual state and the predicted state
appear to be available to the motor system. Moreover,
the comparator mechanisms between these states also
appear to be intact, thus allowing error signals to be
used for adjustments and corrections. Similarly, the
mechanisms of sensory self-attenuation appear to be in-
tact. Neither AHS nor UB patients report feelings of pas-
sivity vis-à-vis their movements, nor do they attribute
them to alien forces, as happens in delusions of control
in schizophrenia in which predictors are thought to be
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impaired. Note, in particular, that although AHS patients
will complain that their anarchic hand has a will of its
own or does what it wants to do, they do not claim, as
patients with delusions of control are wont to do, that
some alien force, such as the CIA, a computer, or the
examiner, has taken control of their hand. Similarly, the
integrity of motor prediction models may contribute to
explaining the difference in phenomenology between
the anarchic hand and the alien hand sign associated
with involuntary movements. The alien hand sign but not
the anarchic hand is associated with damage to parietal
areas which are thought to be involved in the predictive
control of action (32). 
If agentive self-awareness were generated solely by
low-level mechanisms involved in motor control, we
should not expect to see a discrepancy in agentive self-
awareness between AHS and UB patients. They should
enjoy the same kind of agentive self-awareness. Yet,
they do not. If this discrepancy cannot be explained by
the comparator model, can it be explained by the narra-
tive approach?
The narrative approach to agentive self-awareness
Although the comparator approach permeates much of
the recent literature on agentive self-awareness it does
not enjoy a monopoly. A very different approach to agen-
tive self-awareness refers to holistic, domain-general,
central-systems mechanisms of self-interpretation that
have more to do with narrative self-understanding than
with motor control. According to the narrative approach,
our sense of what, if anything, we are up to, is based on
the operations of a high-level integrative process that
draws on the agent’s self-conception and tries to put the
best spin on things that it can. We turn Dennett’s inten-
tional stance inwards, and treat ourselves as ideal
agents, entities whose behavior needs to be made
sense of in the light of what we take to be our beliefs,
desires and intentions. 
Many authors have expressed some sympathy with, and
in some cases whole-hearted commitment to, the narra-
tive approach. Interpreting split-brain studies in the light
of Dennett’s (33) view of the role of narrative in self-in-
terpretation, Roser and Gazzaniga (34,35) have argued
that the left hemisphere contains an interpreter, whose
job it is to make sense of the agent’s own behavior.
Stephens and Graham suggest that a “subject’s sense
of agency regarding episodes in her psychological histo-
ry might depend on her ability to integrate them into her
larger picture of herself” (36). Carruthers suggests that
“…our awareness of our own will results from turning
our mind-reading capacities upon themselves, and com-
ing up with the best interpretation of the information that
is available… where this information doesn’t include
those acts of deciding themselves, but only the causes
and effects of those events” (37). Holistic considerations
also play an important role in Wegner’s influential treat-
ment of agentive self-awareness. According to his theo-
ry of apparent mental causation, the sense of agency is
inferred from the existence of a match between a prior
thought and an observed action. When such prior
thoughts are not forthcoming, we readily confabulate
them (38): 
“The fact is, each of us acts in response to an un-
wieldy assortment of mental events, only a few of
which may be easily brought to mind and understood
as conscious intentions that cause our action. We
may find ourselves at some point in life taking off a
shoe and throwing it out the window, or at another
point being sickeningly polite to someone we detest.
At these junctures, we may ask ourselves, What am
I doing? Or perhaps sound no alarms at all and in-
stead putter blithely along assuming that we must
have meant to do this for some reason. We perform
many unintended behaviors that then require some
artful interpretation to fit them into our view of our-
selves as conscious agents. Even when we didn’t
know what we were doing in advance, we may trust
our theory that we consciously will our actions and so
find ourselves forced to imagine or confabulate
memories of ’prior’ consistent thoughts.”
A wide array of evidence can be marshalled in support
of the narrative theory. When young children happen to
achieve a goal by luck, they will say that they had in-
tended the action that yielded that goal all along (39).
Proponents of the narrative approach have also drawn
on studies of patients with brain damage. Patients with
anosognosia for hemiplegia say that they are currently
raising their arm when, in fact, their arm has not moved.
When it is pointed out to the patient that his arm has not
moved, he may confabulate an excuse for his inertia
(40,41). Split-brain subjects are prone to confabulate ac-
counts of actions that are generated by their right hemi-
sphere (42). Data from subjects in altered states of con-
sciousness also support the narrative approach. For ex-
ample, bizarre behaviors performed in response to hyp-
notic suggestion are often accompanied by elaborate ra-
tionalizations and confabulation on the part of the agent
(43). Stephens and Graham (36) have proposed a nar-
rative account of delusions of control and thought-inser-
tion that builds on the suggestion made by the psychia-
trist Louis Sass that schizophrenic patients with delu-
sions of alien control no longer feel as though they are
in control of their actions because “particular thoughts
and actions may not make sense in relation to the
whole” (44). Finally, the narrative approach derives sup-
port from a number of laboratory studies with normal
subjects, in which it has been shown that agentive judg-
ments can be modulated by priming and by various con-
textual parameters (45-48).
The narrative approach can be challenged in several
ways4. One challenge concerns its ability to explain the
phenomenological discrepancy between AHS and UB.
Does it fare better than the comparator approach? Pri-
ma facie, it is difficult to see how one could account for
this discrepancy between the AHS and UB drawing on-
ly on the resources provided by the narrative account.
What narrative constraints might lead the patient with
AHS to deny that the movement is hers and at the same
time lead the patient with UB to incorporate his actions
into his ongoing self-narrative? The theorist might sug-
gest that the differences between these two syndromes
E. Pacherie
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reflect pre-morbid individual differences: perhaps AHS
patients are predisposed to alienate their stimulus-driv-
en actions, whilst UB patients are predisposed to self-
ascribe their stimulus-driven actions. But this proposal is
implausible, since one would expect pre-morbid differ-
ences in “attributional style” to be evenly distributed be-
tween AHS and UB patients. 
Alternatively, the narrative theorist might suggest that
one of these disorders involves damage not only to the
mechanisms of action production, but also to the mech-
anisms of narrative self-interpretation. One possibility
would be that AHS patients have impaired mechanisms
of narrative self-interpretation. But this proposal, too, is
implausible. Why should this narrative impairment be
manifested only with respect to actions performed by the
anarchic hand? Could it be the other way around, i.e.
could it be UB patients who have impaired mechanisms
of narrative self-interpretation? If this were the case,
AHS patients would have intact mechanisms of self-in-
terpretation and hence would realize that the behavior of
their anarchic hand does not fit their self-conception. In-
deed, in intermanual conflict, patients with AHS would
be hard put to come up with a coherent narrative of their
inconsistent actions and although the contradiction may
not be as blatant when the anarchic hand is acting
alone, what the hand does may still conflict with the
agent’s conscious intentions. In contrast, patients with
UB would have impaired mechanisms of narrative self-
interpretation resulting in self-attribution of their stimu-
lus-driven actions by default, without these actions first
being checked for consistency with their self-narrative.
There is some evidence that UB patients have an abnor-
mal narrative mechanism of self-interpretation, for al-
though they confabulate explanations for why they act-
ed, their confabulations are unusual. Unlike split-brain
patients, patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, or post-
hypnotic subjects, who will readily confabulate all sorts
of personal reasons for their actions, the UB patient of-
fers only impersonal rationalizations such as “I thought
this was the thing to do” or “I thought you wanted me to
do that”. The fact that UB patients do not explain their
actions in terms of their own desires or intentions sug-
gests that, in a sense, they lack access to their self-nar-
ratives. 
Thus, there is something to be said for this last propos-
al. We can also see how this narrator-based explanation
could, in principle, be combined with a comparator-
based approach to agentive self-awareness. Simply put,
comparator-based mechanisms would be responsible
for the generation of a thin form of agentive self-aware-
ness, but the agent’s narrative self-conception might
place substantive constraints on the deliverances (or
output) of these low-level mechanisms, determining
whether they are to be accepted or vetoed. In patients
with AHS, the intact narrative mechanisms of self-inter-
pretation would veto the deliverances of the comparator-
based mechanisms, while in patients with UB these nar-
rative mechanisms would be impaired and have lost
their capacity to veto, resulting in acceptance by default
of the thin form of agentive self-awareness generated by
comparator mechanisms. 
Yet, there are further features of both UB and AHS that
make it unlikely that this explanation provides the whole
story. Rather, they suggest that a piece is still missing in
the puzzle of agentive self-awareness.
Adding a piece to the puzzle
In both UB and AHS, the agents engage in stimulus-
driven actions. Yet, full-blown agency of the kind hu-
mans normally enjoy involves more than just the capac-
ity to perform or veto stimulus-driven actions. We also
normally have a capacity for willed actions, i.e., actions
driven by endogenously generated intentions, the per-
formance of which might involve inhibiting stimulus-driv-
en actions that conflict with them. The agency of AHS
and UB patients is differentially impaired. Although both
types of patients have lost the capacity to inhibit stimu-
lus-driven actions, UB patients seem also to have lost
the capacity to generate and act on endogenous inten-
tions, whereas AHS patients have not lost this capacity. 
Lhermitte’s descriptions of UB emphasize the loss of au-
tonomy that these patients undergo. Not only are they
powerless in the face of influences from the outside
world, but, when lacking external stimulation to steer
them into action, they exhibit mental inertia and apathy.
In contrast, patients with AHS have retained the ability to
prepare and execute willed actions (at least with the
non-anarchic hand). Moreover, they do not merely no-
tice a conflict between what their hand does and their
consciously held goals; they try to stop their hand acting
in unwanted ways and express frustration at the failure
of their attempts at suppression. As noted by Marcel
(49), environmentally driven behaviour is quite common
in normal people especially during low arousal and after
waking and it gives rise to characteristic slips of action.
Yet, when normal people notice a conflict between what
they do and their conscious intentions, they do not dis-
own their actions in the way AHS patients disown the ac-
tions of their anarchic hand. The main reason for this dif-
ference appears to be that when normal people notice
they are acting in unwanted ways, they have no trouble
suppressing their action. Finally, the behavior of the an-
archic hand is not always at odds with the patients’ con-
scious intentions. For instance, Feinberg and col-
leagues (17) report that one specific and chronic com-
plaint of a patient was that he felt that his right, anarchic
hand anticipated future actions and performed move-
ments prior to his actually intending them. 
Several major theories of behavioral control posit a di-
chotomy between systems acting in response to exoge-
nous stimuli and those operating according to endoge-
nously generated goals and plans. In the model devel-
oped by Shallice and co-workers (50-52), the contention
scheduling system handles routine and stimulus-driven
actions, whereas the supervisory attentional system
comes into play to select responses in accordance with
higher-level goals. Similarly, Goldberg’s influential mod-
el of motor control (7,53) distinguishes between a later-
al system that is dominant during actions triggered by or
performed in response to sensory stimuli and a medial
system that dominates when the task is internally guid-
ed. Goldberg’s model is based on the hypothesis that
both AHS and UB result from an imbalance between lat-
eral and medial systems. Accordingly, in AHS, following
unilateral damage to the medial system, contralateral
movements would be driven largely by the preserved,
externally-triggered lateral system. In UB, damage to
the medial system would be more extensive and bilater-
al. 
More recently, Frith et al. (18) proposed that one lateral-
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ized medial frontal structure, the SMA, was specifically
involved in selection for action and inhibition of external
action triggers and that a separate, high-level control
system, akin to Shallice’s supervisory attentional sys-
tem, mediates goals and intended actions. In their mod-
el, AHS would result from unilateral damage to the SMA,
but the high-level control system would be intact, allow-
ing the patients to perceive the discrepancies between
their intentions and their actions. In contrast, in UB this
high-level system would be damaged. 
Frith et al. further claim that in AHS motor control is im-
paired but not awareness of action, and that this is “be-
cause the impairment concerns the mechanisms by
which the controller constructs and selects the precise
movements required for an action. These processes are
not available to consciousness” (18). But this hypothesis
provides no explanation for the peculiar experience of
Feinberg’s patient who felt that that the movements of
his hands anticipated his intentions, or for the difference
in phenomenology between normal people performing
unwanted environmentally driven actions and patients
with AHS. Furthermore, the claim that activity in the
SMA contributes nothing to agentive self-awareness is
in contradiction with experimental evidence: indeed,
Fried et al. (54) reported that electrical stimulation of the
SMA could elicit in their patients a subjective “urge” to
perform a movement in the absence of an overt motor
response. More recently, in an experiment using TMS,
Haggard and Magno (25) instructed subjects to react to
an auditory stimulus by pressing a response key and to
report the position reached by a rotating clockhand at
the point at which they pressed the key. They showed
that applying TMS over the primary motor cortex creat-
ed a large delay of the actual reaction time (movement
onset) but a much smaller delay of the time of aware-
ness of movement, whereas applying TMS over the
SMA led to a much smaller delay of actual reaction time
but to a greater delay in the awareness of movement.
These clinical and experimental data suggest that en-
dogenously generated actions may have a specific phe-
nomenological signature, namely a sense of urge or ef-
fort. One may further speculate that for an action to be
experienced as caused by an intention at the time of the
action itself, it is not enough that intention and action be
narratively consistent. Rather, in the same way that the
intentional binding of movement and effect appears to
depend on efferent signals from the motor control cir-
cuits that generate and control the physical movement
itself, the binding of intention and action may depend on
efferent signals from the higher-level control system that
implements the intention.
If there is indeed a form of agentive self-awareness
characteristic of willed actions, it seems that neither a
comparator-based approach nor a narrator-based ap-
proach can capture it. The narrative approach cannot
account for the phenomenological signature of willed ac-
tions, because the processes it calls into play are inter-
pretive processes rather than processes actually in-
volved in high-level motor control. The comparator-
based approach cannot account for the phenomenolog-
ical signature of willed actions because it holds the sys-
tem(s) responsible for agentive experiences to be nest-
ed within low-level mechanisms of motor production
common to willed and to stimulus-driven actions. But, if
a central characteristic of human motor control is its
multi-layered hierarchical structure, why tie agentive
self-awareness solely to lower mechanisms of motor
control and not conceive of it as also multi-layered? By
the pitching their interpretations either too high or too
low, the comparator-based and narrative approaches
both miss the central layer of agentive self-awareness.
UB patients have lost the capacity for full-blown agency:
they can neither form nor implement willed intentions
and their self-agentive awareness is downsized accord-
ingly. Having lost the capacity to will their actions, they
have also lost the capacity to experience them as un-
willed. AHS patients have not lost the capacity to form
willed intentions but they have lost the capacity to imple-
ment them when they involve movements of the anar-
chic hand. Their self-agentive awareness reflects their
motor impairment: they experience their will as power-
less. 
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